TOP STORET

April 11, 1963

HEMORANDUM FOR: 3 - The Secretary

FROM: G - U. Aleris Johnson

SUBJECT: U-2 Flights, Cube -- Contingency Flans.

Attached is a revised varsion of contingency plans on U-2 flights over Cubs which takes account of formal community made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Makesers will discussing this draft with the JCS towarrow sorming.


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


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
COVER MENO DATED APPILIT, 1963 DECLASSIFIED BY: DEP. DIR TAREGON, DASD(TA) ON: 3100T1989 0ASO(PA) DFOISR 88-FOT-1267 88-TS-121-DOC# (3) - (3) STACE DOC 108 REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE



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'U-2' FLIGHTS, CUBA '-- CONTINGINCY PLANS

FACTS BEARING ON PRODUM

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able degree of confidence that Washington should, within minutes, have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2-by a SAM. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of

While not a certainty, present intelligence resources give a consider-

- 2. There is no presently available alternative to U-2 surveillance which which would neet the presently approved coverage requirements.
- C. Before taking motion that could result in Soviet retaliation, it would be highly desirable and militarily prodent to bring our forces, it is positively JAC, to a high degree of readiness as well as to evacuate Topoplants from Guantamano and mainforce that base. The stage would require approximately 72 hours and could not be initiate.

 Without almost inneciate public impulation.
- D. From the present posture, and assuming that the facts can be within itself and evaluated within the time drawe now considered probable, and weather permitting, it is californize possible to nownt an attack against a single SAM site within the daylight hours of the arms for as a U-2 is destroyed.
- 2. Political support argues for as much sivance notice as possible to our principal allies, perviousarly those in Europe that might be entangered

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emlangered by Soviet retaliation.

the more opportunity he is given to make threats of retaliation from which he would find it difficult to withdraw and thus increase the dangers of escalation and/or confusion among our allies.

- a. With public blyance varming and/or other indicators of invirant Covict often. Fellowed by:
 - l. Unoverseasel sytroit.
 - 1. Stepencofulnation

- 2. <u>introde kavance public bounds and/or other indicators of buildent</u> Seviet region:
 - 1. Ungrama saful autack.
 - 2. Stepopolis actack
- 3. Limitage by Sovieto of Berlin and Suba.

III. SURESTED COURSES OF MAIL.:

- A. Public advance terming by Soviets and/or other indicators of Indiant action:
 - 1. Stand down U-1 Mights.



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- 2. Initiate military represtions by decisionism of apprepriate
 - DI TON in all W. S. commando, evacuation of dependents and more forcement of Junetusia, etc.
- 3. Inform MAC.
 4. Presidential researce to Macrillan, Adence on, de Prille and
- Formani.

 5. Call Organ of Consultation, CNJ, to obtain reaffirmation
- necessity of everilights.

 6. Imform Jeoretary Acheral of the Inited Notices and consider
- what miditional Hamitad Martions action should be writen.
- 7. Transhit wescage from the President to Emachdism.
- S. Public obatement by the President, including a mass of to the Comban people. The comban people of the comban proposal and the comban people of the com
- 10. If there is a chagie unsuccessful a faction of F-2, recordly concease publicly, including fact T-2 flights will or time, but do not at this story obtack TAN site.

11.

sites.

promptly take out the TAM site identified as bowing orders out the attack.

12. If attacks the resumed, significanceusly take out remaining take.

If there is a decord attack -- archests bl or mesuchability

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- 3. No prior public warming on indicators of invitent Soviet action
 - 1. Unsuccessful sutack:
 - a. Announce grablinly fact of actock.
 - b. Tale all reasures union III. A. alove.
 - 2. Successful amback.

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launched.

Juantamano.

- a. Initiate military perpendicus for attack on Bill site.
 - b. Declare appropriate DL/USHs in all United States commands, and initiate evaluation of dependents and acinforcement of
 - c. Transmit Precidential massage to Ekrusholev For delivery at hour attack on EAH is to be launched. (Lausage should simultaneously be given to Seviet Arbansador in Mashington.)
- gd. Enform MaS imposseptoly prior to abtook.
- of the United Matiers at time satisfy is infinitely never for immediate Security Council mosting at same time.
- f. Call mosting of Organ of Consultation of the CAS we elsewhy as possible to time attack schoduled.

Transmit Presidential messages to Albrauan, Lacmillan, de

- Gaulle and Paufani.

 No Issue public statement by Procident as how abteck is
- i. Carry out attack on Mentified Will site.

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C. Minitage by Sovieta of Corlin and Cuba.

If Joviets wholly or proticily blockeds beed in respond to being States attack against all sites, immoviately convend Judicipality around the consider implementation or appropriate modification of "Fredrical Judicipality occurs of continue to earling to earling

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TRANSCRIBED PAGES FOLLOW

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MEMORANDUM FOR: S - The Seretary

FROM: G - U. Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT: Contigency Planning - U-2 Flights, Cuba

Attached is a draft of a paper on this subject worked out by Paul Nitze, a Joint Staff representative, and myself. Annexes to back up the intelligence aspects on page 1 are being prepared.

Work in particular still needs to be done on what, if any, substantive positions could be taken that would give Khrushchev a "way out."

U-2 FLIGHTS, CUBA - CONTINGENCY PLANS

I. FACTS BEARING ON PROBLEM:

- A. While not a certainty, present intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washngton should, within minutes, have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss.
- B. There is no presently available alternative to U-2 surveillance which would meet the presently approved coverage requirements.
- C. Before taking action that could result in Soviet retaliation, it would be highly desirable and militarily prudent to bring our forces, particularly SAC, to a high degree of readiness as well as to evacuate dependents from Guantanamo and reinforce that base. Fuel stops would require approximately 72 hours and could not be initiated without almost immediate public knowledge.
- D. From the present posture, and assuming that the facts can be determined
 - and evaluated within the time frame now considered probable, and weather permitting, it is militarily possible to mount an attack against a single SAM site within the daylight hours of the same day as U-2 is destroyed.
 - E. Political support argues for as much advance notice as possible to our principal allies, particularly those in Europe that might be

endangered by Soviet retaliation.

F. The longer the period of direct or indirect warning to Khrushchev, the more opportunity he is given to make threats of retaliation from which he would find it difficult to withdraw and thus increase the dangers of escalation and/or confusion among our allies.

II. [ILLEGIBLE]:

A. With public advance warning and/or other indications of imminent Soviet

action. Followed by:

- 1. Unsuccessful attack.
- 2. <u>Successful attack</u> [excised]
- B. <u>Without</u> advance public warning and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet action:
 - 1. Unsuccessful attack.
 - 2. Successful attack
- C. Linkage by Soviets of Berlin and Cuba.

III. SUGGESTED COURSES OF ACTION:

- A. Public advance warning by Soviets and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet action.
 - 1. Stand down U-2 flights

- 2. Initiate military preparations by declaration of appropriate DEFCON in all U.S. commands, evacuation of dependents and reinforcement of Guantanamo, etc.
- 3. Inform MAC.
- 4. Presidential messages to Macmillan, Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Fanfani.
- 5. Call Organ of Consultation, OAS, to obtain affirmation necessity of overflights.
- 6. Inform Secretary General of the United Nations and consider what additional United States action should be taken.
- 7. Transmi message from the President to Khrushchev.
- 8. Public statement by the President, including a message to the Cuban people.
- 9. Upon completion of military preparations within about 72 hours resume U-2 flights.
- 10. If there is a single unsuccessful attack on a U-2, promptly announce publicly, including fact U-2 flights will continue, but do not at this stage attack SAM site.
- 11. If there is a second attack successful or unsuccessful promptly take out the SAM site identified as having carried out the attack.
- 12. If attacks are resumed, simultaneously take out remaining SAM sites.

- B. No prior public warning or indication of imminent Soviet action:
 - 1. Unsuccessful attack:
 - a. Announce publicly fact of attack.
 - b. Take all measures under III.A. above.

2. Successful attack:

- a. Initiate military precautions for attack on SAM site.
- b. Declare appropriate DEFCON in all United States commands, and initiate evacuation of dependents and reinforcement of Guantanamo.
- c. Transit Presidential message to Khrushchev for delivery at hour attack on SAM is to be launched. (Message should simultaneously be given to Soviet Ambassador in Washington.)
- d. Inform MAC immediately prior to attack.
- e. Transmit instructions with USUN to inform Secretary General of the United Nations at time attack is initiated and call for immediate Security Council meeting at same time.
- f. Call meeting of Organ of Consultation of the OAS as closely as possible to time attack scheduled.
- g. Transmit Presidential message to Adenauer, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Fanfani.
- h. Issue public statement by President at hour attack is launched.
- i. Carry out attack on identified SAM site.

C. Linkage by Soviets of Berlin and Cuba:

If Soviets wholly of partially blockade Berlin in response to United States attack against SAM sites, immediately convene Quadripartite Group to consider implementation of appropriate modification of "Preferred Sequence" courses of action with regard to Berlin.